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Disaggregating Deliberation’s Effects: An
Experiment within a Deliberative Poll
CYNTHIA FARRAR, JAMES S. FISHKIN, DONALD P. GREEN,
CHRISTIAN LIST, ROBERT C. LUSKIN AND ELIZABETH LEVY
PALUCK*
Using data from a randomized ﬁeld experiment within a Deliberative Poll, this paper examines
deliberation’s effects on both policy attitudes and the extent to which ordinal rankings of policy options
approach single-peakedness (a help in avoiding cyclical majorities). The setting was New Haven,
Connecticut, and its surrounding towns; the issues were airport expansion and revenue sharing – the
former highly salient, the latter not at all. Half the participants deliberated revenue sharing, then the
airport; the other half the reverse. This split-half design helps distinguish the effects of the formal on-
site deliberations from those of other aspects of the treatment. As expected, the highly salient airport
issue saw only a slight effect, while much less salient revenue-sharing issue saw a much larger one.
Fed by normative concerns and empirical questions about the quality of public opinion
and popular decision making, recent years have seen the emergence of a growing body of
research on deliberation’s ability to improve matters.1 Some of the most apt data, in our
view, come from Deliberative Polling, which seeks to gauge the opinions people would
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Affairs, Princeton University. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the annual meeting of the
International Society of Political Psychology, Boston, Mass., 2003, and at the ECPR General Conference,
Marburg, Germany, 2003. The authors are grateful to Ethan Leib, the League of Women Voters of
Connecticut Education Fund Inc.; The Guild Group and Regional Plan Association for assistance in
organizing and carrying out the split-half Deliberative Poll; and to the Carnegie Corporation, the Ford
Foundation, the Renee B. Fisher Foundation, Fannie Mae, William C. Graustein, the New Haven
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New Haven and the United Illuminating Company for making the project possible. The Center for
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1 See, e.g., Robert C. Luskin, James S. Fishkin and Roger Jowell, ‘Considered Opinions: Deliberative
Polling in Britain’; British Journal of Political Science, 32 (2002), 455–87; Jason Barabas, ‘How Deliberation
Affects Policy Opinions’, American Political Science Review, 98 (2004), 687–701; James N. Druckman,
hold if they knew and thought more about the issues. The design gives random samples
both balanced information and the opportunity of talking with one another and question-
ing policy experts. Beginning in 1994, there have been more than thirty national, regional/
statewide/provincial and local Deliberative Polls (DPs) in the United States, Britain,
Australia, Denmark, Hungary, Bulgaria, Italy, Northern Ireland, China and Brazil. More
recently, there have also been two transnational (pan-European) and four on-line DPs
(the latter all national and all in the United States).2
The present study examines three important hypotheses about deliberation’s effects.
The ﬁrst is that deliberation frequently alters policy attitudes (continuous dispositions
towards policy alternatives) – not only at the individual level (‘gross change’) but in the
aggregate (‘net change’). The second is that deliberation tends to bring policy preferences
(ordinal rankings of policy alternatives) closer to single-peakedness, a help in avoiding
cyclical majorities of the sort identiﬁed by Condorcet and Arrow.3 The third is that
both these effects tend to be stronger for less salient issues, on which less deliberation
has already occurred. Since very few issues are highly salient, these hypotheses together
imply an important role for deliberation in shaping majorities and making them
meaningful.
The before-and-after contrasts in Deliberative Polling are consistent with all three
hypotheses. The experience does frequently change policy attitudes and bring policy
preferences closer to single-peakedness.4 The less salient the issue, moreover, the greater
these changes.5 But this evidence still leaves some important questions.
One preliminary question is the extent to which the before-and-after changes result
from the DP experience at all. The whole public, after all, could be changing at the same
time, in the same ways, and to the same degree. That may be generally unlikely but is at
least possible for issues sufﬁciently in the headlines and on people’s lips.6 Several previous
DPs have therefore compared the participants to ‘quasi-control groups’ consisting of
either reinterviewed ‘non-participants’ (members of the initial random sample who
declined to participate) or an independent random sample interviewed at roughly the time
(F’note continued)
‘Political Preference Formation: Competition, Deliberation, and the (Ir)relevance of Framing Effects’,
American Political Science Review, 98 (2004), 671–86.
2 See James S. Fishkin, The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and Democracy (New Haven, Conn.:
Yale University Press, expanded paperback edition, 1997); Robert C. Luskin, James S. Fishkin and Roger
Jowell, ‘Considered Opinions: Deliberative Polling in Britain’, British Journal of Political Science, 32
(2002), 455–87; James S. Fishkin and Robert C. Luskin, ‘Experimenting with a Democratic Ideal:
Deliberative Polling and Public Opinion’, Acta Politica, 40 (2005), 284–98.
3 Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat (the Marquis de) Condorcet, Essai sur l’Application de l’Analyse
a` la Probabilite´ des De´cisions Rendues a` la Pluralite´ des Voix (Paris, 1785); Kenneth Arrow, Social Choice
and Individual Values (New York: Wiley, 1953).
4 See Robert C. Luskin, James S. Fishkin and Kyu S. Hahn, ‘Deliberation and Net Attitude Change’
(paper presented at the biennial General Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research,
Pisa, Italy, 2007); Christian List, Robert C. Luskin, James S. Fishkin and Iain McLean, ‘Deliberation,
Single-Peakedness, and the Possibility of Meaningful Democracy: Evidence from Deliberative Polls’
(unpublished, London School of Economics, 2007).
5 See Luskin, Fishkin and Hahn, ‘Deliberation and Net Attitude Change’; List, Luskin, Fishkin and
McLean, ‘Deliberation, Single-Peakedness, and the Possibility of Meaningful Democracy’.
6 This is a plausible worry for DPs conducted during and about referendum or election campaigns, as
well as in scattered other cases, including DPs about educational policy in Northern Ireland, just as the
current accord was being reached, and about foreign policy in the United States on the eve of the Iraq
war.
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the DP was ending.7 These comparisons lend some reasonable assurance that the before-
and-after changes do indeed result from ‘something’ in the DP experience.8
That something, moreover, would seem to be a function of deliberation.9 The particip-
ants typically learn a great deal,10 and those who emerge knowing the most tend both
to change their views the most11 and to account for most of the approach to single-
peakedness.12
But that still leaves the question of exactly what aspect(s) of the treatment is (are)
responsible. The DP treatment includes everything from the initial interview to the ﬁnal
questionnaire: among other things, the invitation to participate; brieﬁng materials laying
out competing arguments; a weekend’s worth of formal, balanced deliberation in both
small group discussions and plenary questioning of panels of policy experts and policy
makers; the casual, generally much less balanced anticipatory deliberation between the
initial interview and the weekend; and the conversational spillover into corridors and
dining rooms during the weekend. Of particular interest is the formal, on-site delibera-
tion. The whole intervention may be considered broadly deliberative, but this is the heart
of it, as well as the greatest departure from the participants’ everyday experience and the
closest approximation to what theorists of ‘deliberative democracy’ have in mind.
This study uses a randomized experiment within a DP to estimate the effect of the
formal, on-site deliberation. The experiment randomly assigns the participants to deliber-
ate one or the other of two distinct policy issues, one much more salient than the other,
7 Of course, both samples are corroded – unequally – by non-response/non-participation, depriving
these comparisons of the full authority of true random assignment. Barabas’s analysis of much the same
question involves broadly similar quasi-control groups (created in his case by matching), though with a
highly non-random participant sample and hence lesser external validity.
8 See also James S. Fishkin and Robert C. Luskin, ‘Bringing Deliberation to the Democratic Dialogue:
The NIC and Beyond’, in Maxwell McCombs and Amy Reynolds, eds, A Poll with a Human Face: The
National Issues Convention Experiment in Political Communication, (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum,
1999); Robert C. Luskin, James S. Fishkin, Ian McAllister, John Higley and Pamela Ryan, ‘Information
Effects in Referendum Voting: Evidence from the Australian Deliberative Poll’ (paper presented at the
annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, Mass.; 2002); Barabas, ‘How
Deliberation Affects Policy Outcomes’.
9 The changes could conceivably if implausibly stem simply from the stimulation of the initial inter-
view, which even without the invitation to and anticipation of the DP should produce some heightened
attention and thought. Luskin, Fishkin, McAllister, Higley, and Ryan, ‘Information Effects in Refer-
endum Voting: Evidence from the Australian Deliberative Poll,’; Robert C. Luskin and James S. Fishkin,
‘Deliberative Polling, Public Opinion and Democracy: the Case of the National Issues Convention’ (paper
presented at the annual meeting of the American Association for Public Opinion Research, 1998); and
Robert C. Luskin, Shanto Iyengar and James S. Fishkin, ‘Considered Opinions on U.S. Foreign Policy:
Face-to-Face versus Online Deliberative Polling’ (Center for Deliberative Democracy, Stanford Uni-
versity, 2006) address this concern by comparing to quasi control groups likewise interviewed before as
well as after the deliberations.
10 See, e.g., Luskin, Fishkin and Jowell, ‘Considered Opinions’; Robert C. Luskin, James S. Fishkin,
Roger Jowell and Allison Park, ‘Learning and Voting in Britain: Insights from the Deliberative Poll’
(paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Ga. 1999);
Robert C. Luskin, James S. Fishkin and Dennis L. Plane, ‘Deliberative Polling and Policy Outcomes:
Electric Utility Issues in Texas’ (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Public
Policy Analysis, 1999); Luskin, Fishkin, Higley and Ryan, ‘Information Effects in Referendum Voting’.
11 See, e.g., Luskin, Fishkin and Jowell, ‘Considered Opinions’; and Luskin, Fishkin, Higley and Ryan,
‘Information Effects in Referendum Voting’.
12 See List, Luskin, Fishkin and McLean, ‘Deliberation, Single-Peakedness, and the Possibility of
Meaningful Democracy’.
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then has them answer the same questions as when ﬁrst interviewed, then has them
deliberate the other issue, and ﬁnally has them answer the same questions again. The
midterm measurement – at the point at which the participants have all had the same
treatment, except for deliberating one issue versus the other – is particularly revealing. To
the extent that it is the on-site deliberation that is producing the overall change, the
attitude change and approach to single-peakedness should be greater, on each issue,
among those who have just ﬁnished deliberating that issue than among those who have
just ﬁnished deliberating the other issue. We also expect the deliberation to have a greater
effect on the less salient issue.
DELIBERATION AND SALIENCE, POLICY ATTITUDES AND PROXIMITY
TO SINGLE-PEAKEDNESS
Our ﬁrst hypothesis, again, is that deliberation frequently produces aggregate change in
policy attitudes, regarded as continuous dispositions towards policy alternatives. Individual-
level change should be common. Even in ordinary surveys, respondents frequently give
different answers when reinterviewed, partly or mostly as a result of non-attitudinal
bouncing-around.13 The deliberation in Deliberative Polling should make for greater and
more purposive change. Some participants can be expected to draw truer, tauter con-
nections between their policy attitudes and their own more fundamental values and
interests. Others may redeﬁne their interests or re-weight their values (perhaps sometimes
gravitating towards thinking in terms of a wider public interest).14 Of course, these
individual-level changes could largely cancel out, with some participants moving one way,
and others moving equally the other way: there could be much gross but little net change.
But there is no reason to expect that, and considerable reason to suspect the contrary,
given some correlation between interests and initial thought and information. Which way
any net change should run is another question, beyond our scope here. The answer
undoubtedly depends on the issue and the setting, but net change should in any event be
common – as the evidence from previous DPs conﬁrms.15
Our second hypothesis concerns policy preferences, regarded as ordinal rankings of
policy alternatives. Here, our contention – that deliberation tends to increase what we
shall call ‘proximity to single-peakedness’ – needs more explanation. A combination of
preferences is single-peaked across individuals if the alternatives can be aligned on some
‘structuring’ dimension, say from left to right, such that every individual has a most
preferred alternative and a decreasing preference for other alternatives as they get more
13 Philip E. Converse, ‘The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics’, in David E. Apter, ed., Ideology
and Discontent (New York: Free Press, 1964). Cf. Jennifer Hill and Hanspeter Kriesi, ‘An Extension and
Test of Converse’s ‘‘Black-and-White’’ Model of Response Stability’, American Political Science Review,
95 (2001), 397–414.
14 To the extent that the ﬁrst mechanism predominates, we should expect to see attitudes change so as
to increase their predictability from socio-demographic variables, proxying interests; to the extent that
the second predominates, they may change so as to decrease it. See Luskin, Fishkin and Jowell,
‘Considered Opinions’; Robert C. Luskin, ‘The Heavenly Public: What Would the Ideal Citizenry Be
Like?’, in Michael B. MacKuen and George Rabinowitz, eds, Electoral Democracy (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 2003).
15 Across ﬁfty policy attitude indices in seven DPs, the mean absolute net change of opinion ranges
from 0.068 to 0.117, averaging 0.092, impressively large for net attitude change (for reasons sketched in
Luskin 2002). Thirty-four (68 per cent) of the ﬁfty indices show statistically signiﬁcant net change. See
Luskin, Fishkin and Hahn, ‘Deliberation and Net Attitude Change’.
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distant in either direction from it.16 This is single-peakedness as originally deﬁned by
Black and Arrow,17 sometimes called ‘ordinal’ single-peakedness, as distinct from the
‘cardinal’ or ‘spatial’ single-peakedness in the spatial voting model.18
Single-peakedness matters because it affords an escape from the possibility of cyclical
collective preferences in pairwise majority voting, as in Condorcet’s paradox.19 If one
third of an electorate prefer x to y to z, another third prefer y to z to x, and the remaining
third prefer z to x to y, two-to-one majorities prefer x to y, y to z, and z to x. The winning
alternative depends on the pair of alternatives put forward. Such ‘majority cycles’ and
their numerous generalizations20 undermine the meaningfulness of majority rule.21 But
single-peakedness precludes cycling,22 ensuring a Condorcet winner (an alternative that
beats, or is tied with, all others in pairwise majority voting).
Note that single-peakedness is a binary property – a combination of preferences is
either single-peaked, or it is not – that in populations (or samples) of any size is
exceedingly unlikely ever to obtain. Following List, Luskin, Fishkin and McLean,23 we
therefore deﬁne proximity to single-peakedness as S5m/n, where m is the size of the
largest subset of sample members whose combination of preferences is single-peaked and
n is the overall sample size (m< n).24 If there were a dimension on which everyone’s
preferences were single-peaked, m would equal n, and S would equal 1.25 Proximity to
16 For example, consider a population/sample of four individuals, with (declining) preference orderings
(x, y, z), (z, y, x), (y, x, z), and (y, z, x). These preference orderings are single-peaked, with structuring
dimension [x, y, z]. Each individual has a ﬁrst preference, a second preference on one side of it, and a third
preference no ‘closer’ (in terms of ordinal slots) to it. By contrast, if a ﬁfth individual with the preference
ordering (x, z, y) is added to this population/sample, the preferences are no longer single-peaked. They are
not single-peaked with respect to the structuring dimension [x, y, z], because the ﬁfth individual prefers x,
then z, which is ‘further’ than y from x on this dimension. And there is no other possible structuring
dimension (left–right ordering of x, y and z) with respect to which all ﬁve preference orderings are single-
peaked. For a more precise deﬁnition, see List, Luskin, Fishkin and McLean, ‘Deliberation, Single-
Peakedness, and the Possibility of Meaningful Democracy’.
17 Duncan Black, ‘On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making’, Journal of Political Economy, 56
(1948), 23–34 and Kenneth Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values.
18 See Steven J. Brams, Michael A. Jones and D. Marc Kilgour, ‘Single-Peakedness and Disconnected
Coalitions’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 14 (2002), 359–83. Cardinal single-peakedness is sufﬁcient but
unnecessary for ordinal single-peakedness if the space is one-dimensional, but neither sufﬁcient nor
necessary if the space is multi-dimensional.
19 Condorcet, Essai sur l’Application de l’Analyse a` la Probabilite´ des De´cisions Rendues a` la Pluralite´
des Voix.
20 For example, Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, and Richard McKelvey, ‘General Conditions
for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models’, Econometrica, 47 (1979), 1085–111.
21 William H Riker, Liberalism against Populism, (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1982).
22 Black, ‘On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making’.
23 List, Luskin, Fishkin and McLean, ‘Deliberation, Single-Peakedness, and the Possibility of Meaningful
Democracy’.
24 In the second example of fn. 16, the largest subset of the population/sample of ﬁve whose preferences
are single-peaked contains four members (the four of the ﬁrst example, with respect to the structuring
dimension [x, y, z]). Thus S5 4/55 0.8. For a more precise deﬁnition and discussion, see List, Luskin,
Fishkin and McLean, ‘Deliberation, Single-Peakedness, and the Possibility of Meaningful Democracy’.
See also Richard G. Niemi, ‘Majority Decision-Making with Partial Unidimensionality’, American
Political Science Review, 63 (1969), 488–97.
25 Note that S concerns the aggregate patterning of preferences across individuals, not necessarily the
cognitive organization of individuals’ preferences (although it may partly reﬂect that). See the further
discussion below and in List, Luskin, Fishkin and McLean, ‘Deliberation, Single-Peakedness, and the
Possibility of Meaningful Democracy’.
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single-peakedness bears a strong positive relationship to the probability of the existence of
a Condorcet winner and a strong negative relationship to the probability of cycles.26
Deliberation should increase proximity to single-peakedness.27 As people talk, learn and
think about the relationships between the alternatives and the criteria for choosing between
them, they may simply adopt an ordering they come to recognize as conventional among
political elites. Or they may inﬂuence each other’s thinking, acquiring more of a shared
understanding of what the relevant issue-space is and how the alternatives are positioned
within it. Or they may independently excogitate a natural ordering urged if not quite com-
pelled by logic. By whatever mix of such mechanisms, deliberation should tend to make
preferences more single-peaked,28 and the evidence from previous DPs suggests that it does.29
Our third hypothesis is that both these effects should be weaker for more salient issues,
which have already received more real-world deliberation. If the issue is salient enough,
many people may already be near their full-information positions, if the real-world delibera-
tion is sufﬁciently good, or entrenched far from them, if not. In either case, there is less
opportunity for Deliberative Polling to have much effect (although, if the real-world
deliberation is sufﬁciently ﬂawed, it might, if the DP lasted far longer than a weekend). Thus
the before-and-after contrasts in previous DPs have tended to show larger net attitude
changes and smaller increases in proximity to single-peakedness for less salient issues.30
THE SPLIT-HALF DELIBERATIVE POLL: DESIGN AND MEASUREMENT
To isolate the effects of the formal on-site deliberations, we have built a fully randomized
ﬁeld experiment into a DP. A random sample drawn from the ﬁfteen towns surrounding
New Haven, Connecticut, deliberated two issues: the level of service to be provided by the
26 Niemi, ‘Majority Decision-Making with Partial Unidimensionality’. This is also supported by
computer simulations reported in List, Luskin, Fishkin, and McLean, ‘Deliberation, Single-Peakedness,
and the Possibility of Meaningful Democracy’.
27 See David Miller, ‘Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice’, Political Studies, 40 (1992: special
issue): 54–67; Jack Knight and James Johnson, ‘Aggregation and Deliberation: On the Possibility of
Democratic Legitimacy’, Political Theory, 22 (1994), 277–96; Christian List, ‘Two Concepts of Agree-
ment’, PEGS: The Good Society, 11 (2003), 72–9; List, Luskin, Fishkin and McLean, ‘Deliberation,
Single-Peakedness, and the Possibility of Meaningful Democracy’. Cf. David Van Mill, ‘The Possibility of
Rational Outcomes from Democratic Discourse and Procedures’, Journal of Politics, 58 (1996), 734–52,
countered by John Dryzek and Christian List, ‘Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A
Reconciliation’, British Journal of Political Science, 33 (2003), 1–28.
28 This does not necessarily mean that deliberation will lead people to converge on some particular
ranking, what List calls ‘agreement at a substantive level’. In fact, the results in List, Luskin, Fishkin and
McLean, ‘Deliberation, Single-Peakedness, and the Possibility of Meaningful Democracy’, suggest that it
may decrease agreement of this sort. Our only claim here is that deliberation increases proximity to single-
peakedness, an instance of what List calls ‘agreement at a meta-level’. See List, ‘Two Concepts of
Agreement’.
29 Across thirteen issues, the index of ‘proximity to single-peakedness’, deﬁned below, increases by an
average of 0.101, on a scale that runs from a variable minimum always. 0 to 1.0. Across the ten low to
moderate salience issues, the average was 0.134 (computed from Table 2 in List, Luskin, Fishkin and
McLean, ‘Deliberation, Single-Peakedness, and the Possibility of Meaningful Democracy’).
30 Across seven DPs, the correlation between pre-deliberation knowledge, proxying salience, and the
mean absolute net change for all the policy attitude indices in that DP is 2.61. See Luskin, Fishkin,
and Hahn, ‘Deliberation and Net Attitude Change’. Across thirteen DPs, the correlation between pre-
deliberation knowledge and the increase in ‘‘proximity to single-peakedness’’ (deﬁned below) is 2.59
(computed from Tables 1 and 3 in List, Luskin, Fishkin, and McLean, ‘Deliberation, Single-Peakedness,
and the Possibility of Meaningful Democracy’).
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local airport and what, if any, sharing there should be of property-tax revenues from new
commercial development.
These issues differed markedly in salience. The airport was centre stage, revenue sharing
barely in the theatre. Over the preceding year, the region’s most widely circulated daily
newspaper mentioned revenue sharing only seven times31 but ran seventy-four articles, plus
editorials and letters from citizens, on airport expansion. The airport coverage spanned the
full range of commonly held views. Thus the participants would already have thought, learnt
and talked far more about the airport than about revenue sharing. Their airport attitudes
would have been more ﬁrmly rooted, their airport preferences already closer to single-peaked.
The on-site deliberations extended from the evening of Friday, 1 March, through
midday on Sunday, 3 March 2002. Of an initial interview sample of 1,032, a total of 133
showed up. The Friday evening session, at which participants dined with members of their
randomly assigned small groups, was designed to orient the participants and acquaint
them with one another. The actual deliberations began Saturday morning. Those inter-
viewees who said they would attend were sent the brieﬁng materials, and those who did
attend were paid $200 on completing the ﬁnal questionnaire.
The participants were generally representative. Compared with the ‘non-participants’
(the initial interviewees who did not attend), they were somewhat more highly educated
and more likely to be from New Haven itself but comparable in income, gender, race and
voter registration (see Appendix A for details). The geographic bias, probably attrib-
utable to the longer commute from suburbs and outlying towns, does not seem to affect
the results. The views of those residing in New Haven moved in the same direction and to
the same extent as the views of those residing in the surrounding towns.
The sixteen small groups were randomly assigned to one of the two possible orders in
which the two issues could be deliberated. Eight groups (containing sixty-four particip-
ants) deliberated the airport Saturday morning and revenue sharing Saturday afternoon,
and the other eight (containing sixty-eight participants) the reverse. We denote these two
treatment groups as ‘A-ﬁrst’ and ‘R-ﬁrst’, respectively.32
The formal on-site deliberations consisted of three ‘deliberative sessions’, each invol-
ving both small-group discussions and plenary questions-and-answers with panels of
policy experts and advocates. The ﬁrst two sessions, occupying the whole of Saturday,
concentrated on one issue apiece, with the ﬁrst conﬁned to the airport for the A-ﬁrst
treatment group and to revenue sharing for the R-ﬁrst treatment group, and the second to
revenue sharing for the A-ﬁrst group and to the airport for the R-ﬁrst group.33 The third,
on Sunday morning, was more synoptic, with all the participants revisiting both issues in
their small groups and then questioning a panel of local and state ofﬁcials about both.
There were three waves of measurement: the initial telephone interview (T1), a written
version of the same questionnaire after the ﬁrst deliberative session (T2), and the same
written version (plus a few additional questions) again at the end of the weekend (T3).
The T1-T2 interval thus spans both the ﬁrst deliberative session on-site and the casual,
31 There was much discussion of residential property taxes and property tax relief for the elderly,
disabled and low-income, but regional revenue sharing was only mentioned brieﬂy in one editorial and as
a low-proﬁle issue in the platform of one unsuccessful mayoral candidate.
32 We shall thus be referring to two sorts of ‘groups’ – the small groups, within which the issues are discussed,
and the treatment groups, each consisting of eight small groups, which tackle the issues in different sequences.
33 The A-ﬁrst and R-ﬁrst groups thus had different plenary sessions on Saturday but shared a plenary
session on Sunday.
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anticipatory learning and deliberation between the ﬁrst interview at T1 and the beginning of
the weekend. The T2–T3 interval spans the second and third deliberative sessions on-site.
From the standpoint of the randomized experiment, the T1-T2 changes are particularly
revealing. At T2, both treatment groups had had the experience of deliberating in a casual, less
balanced way, with relatively homogeneous interlocutors, in the period between the initial
interview and their arrival on site. Both had also had the experience of the more formal and
balanced deliberation with more heterogeneous interlocutors on site, but on different issues.
The A-ﬁrst group had deliberated the airport but not the revenue sharing, and the R-ﬁrst group
the reverse. Thus the contrast between their T1-T2 changes should reﬂect the effects of the
A-ﬁrst group’s airport deliberations and of the R-ﬁrst group’s revenue-sharing deliberations.
The T2–T3 changes can be used similarly, but less certainly, to assess the effects of the
second deliberative session, in which the R-ﬁrst small groups switched to the airport, and the
A-ﬁrst small groups to revenue sharing. This comparison is harder to interpret, since by T2
each group had already deliberated the other issue, and the T2–T3 interval bracketed not only
the second deliberative session but also the third, during which both issues were deliberated.
Perhaps discussing revenue sharing is better preparation for discussing the airport than the
reverse. Perhaps considering them simultaneously at the end alters the effect of the earlier
sequencing. Or perhaps discussing an issue from T1 to T2 continues to have an effect from T2
to T3, even while the other issue is discussed. How far the T2-T3 comparison should be
expected to mirror the T1-T2 comparison is, therefore, unclear.
The questionnaire asked about the main policy alternatives on each issue. For the
airport, these were:
A1.Maintaining: ‘Commercial passenger service to nearby cities should be maintained but
not expanded to serve a larger market.’
A2. Expanding: ‘Commercial passenger service should be expanded to provide more
ﬂights to more places.’
A3. Ending: ‘Commercial passenger service should be ended, leaving only service for
private airplanes.’
For revenue sharing, the main alternatives were:
R1. Local Control: ‘My town should maintain local control over all of its tax revenues
from new businesses and industries.’
R2. Voluntary Sharing: ‘My town should try for a voluntary agreement with other towns
in the region to share some of the tax revenues from new businesses and industries.’
R3. State-encouraged Sharing: ‘The state should provide incentives for towns in the region
to share some tax revenues from new businesses and industries.’
R4. Mandatory Sharing: ‘The state should require towns in the region to share some tax
revenues from new businesses and industries.’
With regard to the expected level of sharing, the two non-mandatory sharing options
(voluntary and state-encouraged) lie between local control, on the one side, and mandatory
sharing, on the other.
We asked policy questions of two distinct sorts: ratings, to gauge attitudes, and rankings, to
gauge preferences. The rating questions asked whether the respondent agreed strongly, agreed
somewhat, neither agreed nor disagreed, disagreed somewhat, or disagreed strongly with each
policy option. The ranking questions asked which option was the respondent’s ﬁrst choice,
then which was his or her second choice, and then, in the case of revenue-sharing, which was
his or her third choice. The lowest-ranked choice can be inferred from the others.
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POLICY ATTITUDES
As we shall see, the DP moved the participants towards wanting to end rather than
expand airport services and towards favouring non-mandatory revenue sharing over
both mandatory sharing and local control. To summarize airport attitudes, therefore,
we subtract the ending from the expanding service rating. Scoring both items from 0, for
strong disagreement, to 1, for strong agreement, yields a difference that runs from 1
for strong agreement with expanding service and strong disagreement with ending it to21
for the reverse. To summarize revenue-sharing attitudes, we create two companion
indices, one pitting the two middle, non-mandatory sharing options against local control,
and the other pitting them against mandatory sharing. In each case, we average the
ratings of the two non-mandatory options and subtract the rating of the alternative.
The indices run from 1 for strong agreement with non-mandatory sharing and strong
disagreement with mandatory sharing/local control and 21 for the reverse.34
Table 1 shows the results. On the airport, although the sample, from start to ﬁnish, was
more inclined to expand than to end airport services, that inclination faded signiﬁcantly
(p, 0.05) over the course of the experiment. The mean airport attitude decreased
from 0.540 to 0.434. On revenue sharing, the sample initially favoured local control
over non-mandatory sharing and the latter over mandatory sharing but came to favour
non-mandatory sharing over both other options. The mean of the index opposing non-
mandatory sharing to local control increased from 20.115 to 0.241 (p, 0.001), and that
of the index opposing non-mandatory to mandatory sharing from 0.166 to 0.385
(p, 0.001). Note that the more salient airport issue shows less net change (only 0.106,
compared to 0.335 and 0.220 on the two revenue-sharing indices). Again these results
echo those of previous DPs, which have frequently shown statistically signiﬁcant net
attitude changes and have done so more frequently on less salient issues.
The present question, however, is the extent to which the net change results from the
formal on-site deliberations. Thus consider the contrast between the two treatment groups
over the T1-T2 interval. Take ﬁrst the less salient revenue-sharing issue, where the net
change is much greater. The mean attitude shifts dramatically from local control towards
non-mandatory sharing in the R-ﬁrst group, discussing the issue during this interval
(0.313), but scarcely budges in the A-ﬁrst group discussing the airport instead (20.012).
The difference is highly signiﬁcant (p, 0.001). The contrast is fainter but similar for non-
mandatory versus mandatory sharing. From T1 to T2, the R-ﬁrst group moves twice
as far towards non-mandatory sharing (0.085 versus 0.039), although in this case the
0.085 is not quite signiﬁcant (p5 0.115), and the difference between 0.085 and 0.039 is
insigniﬁcant. In all, these results suggest that the on-site deliberations drove most of
the net attitude change on revenue sharing.
34 One might expect preferences to reﬂect attitudes – more after deliberation than before and more, at
least initially, on the airport than on revenue sharing – and the results bear this out. Maximum likelihood
estimation of binomial logit models expressing preferences for expanding airport service over ending it,
for non-mandatory revenue sharing over local control, and for non-mandatory over mandatory revenue
sharing as functions of the respective attitude indices produce pre- and post-deliberation (McFadden’s)
pseudo-R2s of 0.479 and 0.680, 0.377 and 0.345, and 0.099 and 0.371, respectively. Preferences are indeed
relatively well predicted by attitudes by the end of the process, are indeed initially better predicted on the
airport than on revenue sharing, and are indeed better predicted after than before deliberation in two of
the three cases. More detailed results are available on request.
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TABLE 1 Policy Attitude Changes
T1 T2 T3 T2-T1 Sig. T3-T2 Sig. T3-T1 Sig.
A. The Airport: Ending v. Expanding Service
A-First (n5 64) 0.500 0.332 0.336 0.168 (0.074) 0.027 20.004 (0.072) 0.957 0.164 (0.078) 0.040
R-First (n5 68) 0.577 0.493 0.526 0.085 (0.062) 0.175 20.033 (0.074) 0.655 0.051 (0.072) 0.477
Whole sample (n5 132) 0.540 0.415 0.434 0.125 (0.048) 0.010 20.019 (0.052) 0.714 0.106 (0.053) 0.048
(A-First) – (R-First) 20.077 20.161 20.190 0.083 (0.096) 0.386 0.029 (0.104) 0.779 0.113 (0.106) 0.291
B. Revenue Sharing: Voluntary Sharing or Incentives v. Local Control
A-First (n5 64) 20.074 20.086 0.232 20.012 (0.049) 0.812 0.318 (0.049) 0.000 0.307 (0.059) 0.000
R-First (n5 68) 20.153 0.160 0.250 0.313 (0.060) 0.000 0.090 (0.043) 0.042 0.403 (0.068) 0.000
Whole sample (n 5 132) 20.115 0.041 0.241 0.155 (0.040) 0.000 0.201 (0.034) 0.000 0.356 (0.045) 0.000
(R-First) – (A-First) 20.078 0.246 0.018 0.324 (0.078) 0.000 20.228 (0.065) 0.001 0.096 (0.091) 0.293
C. Revenue Sharing: Voluntary Sharing or Incentives v. Mandatory Sharing
A-First (n5 64) 0.172 0.211 0.432 0.039 (0.050) 0.434 0.221 (0.059) 0.000 0.260 (0.044) 0.000
R-First (n5 68) 0.160 0.244 0.342 0.085 (0.053) 0.115 0.097 (0.032) 0.004 0.182 (0.048) 0.000
Whole sample (n5 132) 0.166 0.228 0.385 0.063 (0.036) 0.087 0.157 (0.033) 0.000 0.220 (0.033) 0.000
(R-First) – (A-First) 20.012 0.034 20.090 0.045 (0.073) 0.533 20.123 (0.066) 0.064 20.078 (0.066) 0.240
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; p-values are two-tailed.
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The parallel comparison over the T2-T3 interval reinforces the inference. Here it is
the A-ﬁrst group, now discussing revenue sharing, that moves furthest towards non-
mandatory sharing. The R-ﬁrst group continues to move in the same direction, perhaps as
a delayed effect of their earlier deliberation, but less so. When the question is non-
mandatory sharing versus local control, the change is 0.318 in the A-ﬁrst group versus
0.090 in the R-ﬁrst group; when it is non-mandatory versus mandatory sharing, it is 0.221
versus 0.097. In both cases, the difference is highly signiﬁcant (p, 0.001, p5 0.064).
The results on the airport, a more salient issue, where there is less net attitude change to
apportion, are weaker and more mixed. From T1 to T2, both treatment groups shift
towards ending the service. Here too it is the group discussing the issue that changes
noticeably more (0.168 versus 0.085), and the 0.168 is statistically signiﬁcant (p5 0.027),
while the 0.085 is not (p5 0.175). The difference between the 0.168 and the 0.085, how-
ever, is statistically insigniﬁcant (p5 0.386), and neither treatment group shows any real
change from T2 to T3. These results suggest some slight effect of the on-site deliberation
but also suggest some effect of the casual at-home deliberations preceding (and stirred by
the prospect of) the deliberative weekend: thus the noticeable and not-too-different
changes in both treatment groups from T1 to T2, the interval containing the at-home
deliberations, and the stability of both from T2 to T3.
PROXIMITY TO SINGLE-PEAKEDNESS
Our second hypothesis is that deliberation tends to increase proximity to single-peakedness,
deﬁned, as above, as S5m/n. Two further points about S are worth noting. First, S
necessarily< 1, and if all individual preference orderings are strict (no one is indifferent
between any pair of alternatives), S also>Sm5 2
(k21)/k!. 0, where k is the number of
alternatives.35 When k5 3 (as on the airport), Sm5 2/3; when k5 4 (as on revenue-sharing),
Sm5 1/3. Since our data inevitably contain incomplete rankings, implying non-strict
orderings, however, Sm is only an approximate lower bound. Secondly, the dimension on
which m is premised (the one on which the largest subset of participants has single-peaked
preferences) may vary with the treatment group, over time, or both. This leaves S’s sampling
distribution unknown, although its standard error may be bootstrapped.
Table 2 shows S and its bootstrapped standard error for both the whole sample and the
two treatment groups at all three measurements.36 Absent S’s sampling distribution, we
refrain from assertions of statistical ‘signiﬁcance’ or ‘insigniﬁcance’,37 but the estimated
standard errors make it hard to imagine that the larger changes and differences would be
insigniﬁcant.
The results mostly parallel those for attitudes. Overall – across the whole sample from
T1 to T3 – both issues show increased proximity to single-peakedness. Again, and again in
keeping with other DP results,38 the change is minor (0.77 to 0.81) on the high salience
35 Niemi, ‘Majority Decision-Making with Partial Unidimensionality’.
36 A thousand random samples of the relevant subjects were drawn with replacement. The standard
deviation of the resampled S provides the estimate of the standard error.
37 The bootstrapped standard errors, moreover, are for S, not the difference between the values of S at
different times, which may be somewhat larger or (less likely) smaller, depending on the sign and magnitude of
the covariance.
38 List, Luskin, Fishkin and McLean, ‘Deliberation, Single-Peakedness, and the Possibility of Meaningful
Democracy’.
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airport issue but major (0.52 to 0.80) on the low salience revenue-sharing one.39 On the
airport, the contrast between treatment groups suggests little evidence of the on-site
deliberation’s having had much effect. S hardly budges, for either treatment group. On
revenue sharing, however, each treatment group shows a large increase, and almost
entirely during the interval during which it deliberates the issue on site. From T1 to T2, S
increases by 0.31 in the R-ﬁrst group but only by 0.07 in the A-ﬁrst group. From T2 to T3,
it increases by 0.21 in the A-ﬁrst group but decreases by 0.02 in the R-ﬁrst group.40 As in
the case of net attitude change, the DP’s effect on proximity to single-peakedness appears
to be mostly an effect of the on-site deliberation.
DISCUSSION
These results comport with the notion that deliberation tends to produce net attitude change
and bring preferences closer to single-peakedness, at least on issues of low to moderate
salience, if not necessarily on the most salient. We know from previous DP results that there
is a strong negative correlation between the approach to single-peakedness and the magni-
tude of the net change, on the one hand, and the salience of the issue, on the other. On
sufﬁciently salient issues, both the mean attitude and the proximity to single-peakedness may
sit relatively still. But on less salient issues, where the DP produces more movement, it
appears from these results, admittedly based on only two issues, to be the on-site delibera-
tion that is responsible for the lion’s share of it. The highly salient airport issue sees only
minor change, while the not at all salient revenue sharing issue sees very large changes,
mostly during the interval during which the issue is deliberated on site.
TABLE 2 Changes in Proximity to Single-Peakedness (S)*
n T1 T2 T3
A. Whole Sample
Airport 132 0.77 (0.033) 0.84 (0.031) 0.81 (0.032)
Revenue Sharing 132 0.52 (0.042) 0.70 (0.037) 0.80 (0.037)
B. Airport, by Treatment Group
A-First 64 0.80 (0.043) 0.81 (0.049) 0.86 (0.049)
R-First 68 0.82 (0.045) 0.88 (0.049) 0.84 (0.036)
C. Revenue Sharing, by Treatment Group
A-First 64 0.56 (0.060) 0.63 (0.062) 0.84 (0.044)
R-First 68 0.47 (0.057) 0.78 (0.052) 0.76 (0.051)
*Standard errors (in parentheses) bootstrapped, as described in fn. 36.
39 On the airport, the dimension along which the largest sub-sample is single-peaked remains the same
throughout, ordering the alternatives as [A2 A1 A3]. The Condorcet winner, throughout, is A2
(expanding service). On revenue sharing, the dimension along which the largest sub-sample is single-
peaked also remains the same throughout, ordering the alternatives as [R1 R2 R3 R4], although the
Condorcet winner changes from one non-mandatory sharing option to the other – from R3 (state-
encouraged sharing) at T1 to R2 (voluntary sharing) at T3.
40 In each treatment group, the Condorcet winner changes from R3 to R2 over the interval during which
the group deliberates the issue – from T1 to T2 in the R-ﬁrst group and from T2 to T3 in the A-ﬁrst group.
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We previously based this assessment of relative salience on local newspaper coverage,
but our data provide additional evidence. Consider in this light the T1 proximity to single-
peakedness: at T1, S is only 0.52 for revenue sharing but 0.77 for the airport. Of course,
that gap might be thought to exist simply because S’s approximate lower bound Sm is 1/3
for the revenue-sharing issue, with its four alternatives, but 2/3 for the airport, with its
mere three. But the adjusted measure S05 (S2Sm)/(12Sm), taking account of the
number of alternatives, is still noticeably higher for the airport (0.32) than for revenue
sharing (0.27) at T1.41 So the initial difference in proximity to single-peakedness is not
simply due to the difference in the number of alternatives. The participants would appear
to have entered the process already having thought more about and thus acquired more
single-peaked preferences about the airport issue.
The levels of relevant T1 knowledge lend further support. At all three waves, we
asked the participants whether (1) the region’s population was closest to 250,000,
350,000, 550,000 or 750,000; (2) its rate of growth in employment during the 1990s was
more than, about the same as, or less than in the rest of the United States; (3) New
Haven’s population increased, decreased or did not change during the 1990s; (4) the
major source of revenue for most of the region’s town governments is sales taxes,
property taxes, direct state subsidies or direct federal subsidies; (5) state law allows
communities to share property tax revenues; (6) those communities with the most
valuable property tend to have the lowest, average or the highest property tax rates; (7)
the Federal Aviation Authority classiﬁes the regional airport as a major hub, a medium
hub, a minor hub or not a hub; and (8) maintaining the regional airport at its current
level of service would require any signiﬁcant investment. The correct answers are (1)
555,000, (2) less, (3) decreased, (4) property taxes, (5) yes, (6) the lowest, (7) a non-hub,
and (8) yes. Items (7) and (8) are speciﬁcally relevant to the airport, items (4) – (6)
speciﬁcally relevant to revenue sharing, and items (1) – (3) generally relevant to the
politics of the region.
Table 3 shows the percentages of the whole sample and of the two treatment groups
answering the two airport items, the three revenue-sharing items, the three general items
and all eight items correctly at T1, T2 and T3. At T1, the participants averaged answering
38.6 per cent of the airport questions but only 25.4 per cent of the revenue-sharing
questions correctly. Of course, the revenue-sharing knowledge items could simply be
intrinsically harder. But the fact that by T3 the participants actually fared slightly better
on the revenue-sharing items (59.9 per cent versus 54.2 per cent) suggests otherwise. The
participants would appear to have entered the process knowing substantially more about
the airport because it was the more salient issue.
Table 3 also strengthens the claim that it was in fact deliberation producing the net
attitude change and approach to single-peakedness. Deliberation entails learning, and, as
is usual in Deliberative Polling, the participants learnt a great deal. For the whole sample
across all eight items, the mean percentage correct increased by 22.3 per cent.42 The gain
41 In words, S0 is the extent to which S exceeds its minimum, expressed as a fraction of the extent to
which it could do so. Note that S0 necessarily<S (indeed,S for S, 1) and that because Sm is only
approximate, S0 should be taken as heuristic. For more on S and S0, see List, Luskin, Fishkin and
McLean, ‘Deliberation, Single-Peakedness, and the Possibility of Meaningful Democracy’.
42 The T1-T2 gains tend to exceed their T2-T3 counterparts, no doubt because T1-T2 is a much longer
interval, bracketing the receipt of the brieﬁng materials and the anticipatory, off-site deliberations, as well
as the ﬁrst on-site deliberative session.
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was greater on revenue sharing, the less salient issue. The percentage correct increased by
34.5 per cent on revenue sharing versus 15.5 per cent on the airport.
The on-site learning, moreover, appears to be deliberation-based, as the lower tiers of
Table 3 suggest. From T1 to T2, the participants learnt something, presumably before
arrival, about the issue they were not initially deliberating on site (since the brieﬁng
materials and anticipatory, off-site deliberations covered both) but a good deal more,
presumably after arrival, about the topic they were deliberating. The A-ﬁrst group gained
15.6 per cent on the airport but only 6.3 per cent on revenue sharing, while the R-ﬁrst
group gained 40.4 per cent on revenue sharing but only 8.8 per cent on the airport. From
T2 to T3, there was some additional learning but only about the topic being deliberated
then. The A-ﬁrst group gained 18.8 per cent on revenue sharing but less than 1 per cent on
the airport, while the R-ﬁrst group gained 5.9 per cent on the airport but only 2.9 per cent
on revenue sharing.43
The net attitude change and increase in proximity to single-peakedness on revenue
sharing line up nicely with these knowledge gains. From T1 to T2, the A-ﬁrst group learnt
a good deal about revenue sharing, changed its views a good deal, and showed a modest
increase in proximity to single-peakedness. But the R-ﬁrst group learnt still more,
changed its views still more, and showed a much greater increase in proximity to single-
peakedness. From T2 to T3, the A-ﬁrst group, then deliberating revenue sharing, learnt a
good deal on top of what it had learnt from T1 to T2, changed its views a good deal
further, and added greatly to its T1-T2 increase in proximity to single-peakedness. The
R-ﬁrst group learnt only a little, changed its views only a little, and showed no increase in
proximity to single-peakedness (compare Table 3 with Tables 1 and 2). Thus the net
attitude change and approach to single-peakedness not only occur when the participants
TABLE 3 Knowledge Gains
T1 T2 T3 T2-T1 T3-T2 T3-T1
A. Whole Sample, by Topic (n5 132)
Airport 0.386 0.508 0.542 0.121*** 0.034 0.155***
Revenue sharing 0.254 0.492 0.599 0.239*** 0.106*** 0.345***
General 0.417 0.606 0.612 0.189*** 0.006 0.195***
Overall 0.368 0.553 0.591 0.185*** 0.038** 0.223***
B. Airport, by Treatment Group
A-First (n5 64) 0.398 0.555 0.563 0.156*** 0.008 0.164***
R-First (n5 68) 0.375 0.463 0.522 0.088** 0.059* 0.147***
(A-First)-(R-First) 0.023 0.091* 0.040 0.068 20.051 0.017
C. Revenue Sharing, by Treatment Group
A-First (n5 64) 0.273 0.336 0.523 0.063* 0.188*** 0.250***
R-First (n5 68) 0.235 0.640 0.669 0.404*** 0.029 0.434***
(R-First)–(A-First) 20.038 0.304*** 0.146** 0.342*** 20.158** 0.184**
Note: *p, 0.10, **p, 0.05, ***p, 0.01 (based on one-tailed tests).
43 By contrast, the general knowledge items show signiﬁcant but roughly equal gains in both the A-ﬁrst
and R-ﬁrst groups from T1 to T2 and thus from T1 to T3 (results not shown). On these more general
matters, there is no reason to expect the members of either treatment group to learn more during either
interval, and they do not.
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deliberate the issue, but, as these coincident knowledge gains suggest, because they
deliberate it.
All told, these results buttress the case for deliberative democracy. They support the
proposition that at least on policy issues that are not too salient – the great majority of
policy issues – deliberation frequently changes attitudes and makes preferences more
single-peaked. A more deliberative democracy should, therefore, sometimes produce
majorities favouring different policies, parties or candidates and in turn, at least some-
times, bring different governments, enacting different policies. It should also produce
more meaningful majorities, based on preferences that are closer to single-peaked.
APPEND IX A : DEMOGRAPH IC COMPAR I SONS OF PART IC I PANTS , NON- PART IC I PANTS
AND VOT ING POPULAT ION
Participants Non-participants Voting population
(n5 132) (n5 1,024)
Age (in years) 50.1 50.1 47.0
Registered to vote 90.2% 88.6% 78.7%
Marital status
Single 30.3% 29.3% 29.0%
Married 49.2% 52.4% 52.5%
Divorced/Separated/Widowed 19.7% 17.3% 18.5%
Education
Less than/some high school 2.3% 4.2% 17.0%y
High school graduate 9.1% 20.2% 30.8%
Some college 25.0% 21.1% 18.2%
College graduate 28.0% 29.1% 21.7%
Trade/Technical 3.0% 2.5% –
Graduate school 32.6% 22.2% 12.4%
Income $61–70,000 $61–70,000 $64,018
Race
African-American 12.1% 7.2% 8.3%y
Caucasian 72.7% 75.3% 78.1%
Hispanic or Latino* 3.0% 4.4% 9.6%
Other 9.1% 9.1% 4.0%
Gender
Male 50.8% 47.2% 46.8%y
Female 49.2% 52.8% 53.2%
Note: Percentages may not add up to 100 in non-participant blocks due to ‘refusal’ category.
*For population 15 and over.
yFor population 25 and over.
yFor population 18 and over.
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